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The purpose of this paper is to examine the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
proposed landmark rule regarding director nominations by shareholders. Specifically, the 
paper will address the following issues: (1) What is Shareholder Proxy Access? (2) 
Corporate Governance and issues that are influencing this proposed rule (3) Proponents 
view of this proposal. (4) Adversaries of the proposal. (5) Survey of Institutional 
Investors (6) Interviews and Opinions. These topics and more will be examined and 
discussed at length throughout the paper and will help enhance the readers knowledge of 
what exactly is the importance of this proposed rule by the SEC. Shareholder Proxy 
Access is a proposed ruling by the Securities and Exchange Commission that at this point 
in time seems to be in a holding pattern. There are several issues to contend with in 
regards to the passing of this proposed ruling that has gone through heated debate among 
shareholder groups, institutional investors and a variety of special interest and business 
groups. This issue was also on the minds of the Presidential nominees during the recent 
Presidential election. George W. Bush has not at this point publicly weighed in on the 
shareholder access issue. John Kerry has and is on record as saying that he believes "that 
the SEC should allow long-term significant investors to have a voice in the selection of a 
portion of a company's board of directors." In a statement submitted to the AFL-CIO 
(American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Unions) he said, "I believe that 
additional actions are necessary to ensure that corporate boards of directors are 
accountable to investors. For example, I strongly support the recent U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) action to increase the shareholder voice in executive 
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compensation practices. I also believe that the SEC should allow long-term significant 
investors to have a voice in the selection of a portion of a company's board of directors." 
The SEC may decide to postpone any decision on the issue until after the November 
election period and possibly until the beginning of next year. In fact, William 
Donaldson, the current SEC Chairman, has been quoted as saying that there would be no 
final ruling until "meaningful consensus" was reached and that further action is very 
unlikely before Election Day. The basic goal of this proposed rule is to enhance 
corporate governance efforts in the aftermath of a barrage of corporate scandals that has 
shaken investor confidence and trust. "The issue has deeply divided the normally 
collegial five member commission" (TheHill.com, SEC Struggles with Shareholder 
Access, March 1 1 ,  2004). 
During the tum of the last century good corporate governance issues were not exactly the 
first topic on both companies and shareholder's minds as the stock market was breaking 
record highs. However, corporate scandals such as those at Enron and WorldCom sent 
the financial world spiraling out-of-control, both in the United States and abroad. In 
many instances these corporate scandals were linked to the excessiveness and hubris of 
company officers and directors who had one or both hands in the companies' coffers. 
The balance of interest at this point in time was solely focused on management's interest 
and as long as the shareholder was seeing multiple returns on their investments the focus 
was not centered on changing the corporate culture of a companies board. In the wake of 
these scandals is a changing environment that makes it acceptable for an independent 
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director to play a more verbose role in the company's growth. "Much of this attitude can 
be attributed to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the legislative overhaul of corporate governance 
standards passed by Congress in 2002, as well as tougher new listing requirements by the 
nation's stock exchanges". (The Detroit Business News, Pressure Increases on 
Independent Directors amid Corporate Governance Scrutiny, February 28, 2004). 
The debate over shareholder access to management proxy cards and materials in order to 
nominate directors and other issues had been re-energized with a rulemaking petition 
submitted on August 1 ,  2003 to the Securities and Exchange Commission by the 
Committee of Concerned Shareholders and James McRitchie. The group wants the SEC 
to amend Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the rule governing 
shareholder resolutions, so that companies could no longer exclude proposals relating to 
the election of directors. The Committee of Concerned Shareholders, a group of 
individual shareholders who met on the internet and ran a grass roots proxy contest to 
replace director's at Luby's, Inc., and McRitchie, the editor of CorpGov.net, said 
"entrenched managers and directors will only improve corporate governance when they 
can be held personally accountable, e.g. voted out of office and replaced." Their petition, 
file #4-461 at the SEC, would enable any shareholder eligible to submit a resolution­ 
those continuously owning at least $2,000 worth of stock for at least one year-to 
nominate director candidates satisfying certain requirements. As proposed, shareholders 
would have to provide a letter of nomination containing a statement that the candidate 
would serve as director and include key information, including the candidate's name, age, 
business address, relationships with the company and work experience. The petition also 
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called on the SEC to prohibit broker votes (votes cast by brokers without the written 
consent of the beneficial owners) on the election of directors. 
Also, eRaider, an internet confederation of investors, recently petitioned the SEC on the 
issue. The organization asked the SEC to mandate that public companies must place the 
names of all legitimate director candidates on ballots distributed to shareholders. The 
group had also urged the SEC to disallow broker votes for any candidate, to ban the use 
of corporate funds for campaigning for any candidate and to strike down unreasonable 
qualification tests for director candidates. Their petition did not set any requirements for 
director candidates, though it did state that it has no objection to some qualifications, 
such as age and stock ownership. In addition to eRaider, the Social Investment Forum, a 
trade association for financial practitioners promoting the growth, concept and practice of 
socially responsible investing, recently submitted a letter to the SEC asking it to consider 
requiring two candidates for each open board seat and to develop a way for companies to 
include shareholder nominations. 
On October is", 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published 
proposed rules allowing shareholders a new, but severely limited ability to propose 
nominees for corporate boards. Currently, investors have the ability and right to put forth 
a "short-slate", or limited number of candidates for a board election, however, they must 
do so at their own expense. "Not having direct access to the corporate ballot means that 
investors have to spend huge sums to orchestrate a proxy contest, a step that's ordinarily 
reserved for hostile takeover attempts" (Investors Seek Proxy Election Reform, LA 
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Times, 2003, February 19). Damon Sivers, the associate general counsel at the AFL­ 
CIO, stated," I think that ifwe are trying to see to it that the corporate governance 
system works, then this is an inevitable reform." As a result, the election process to 
strengthen the independence and responsiveness of corporate boards disenchants many 
investors. The new SEC proposal has come under fire due to the fact that it requires 
certain "triggers" to take place in order for shareholders to earn the right to nominate a 
director to a board. The proposed rule places a stringent cap on how many candidates 
can be nominated, who can nominate, and under what conditions of corporate 
malfeasance investors can gain the right to propose a nominee. 
The two triggering events that would have to occur in order for this rule to come into 
affect would be: 
• Withhold votes for at least one director totaling more than 35 percent of the votes 
cast at an annual meeting after January 1 2004. 
• A majority vote on a resolution to request shareholder access at an annual meeting 
after January 1, 2004. In order to be eligible to submit such a resolution, a 
shareholder or group of shareholders must own more than 1 percent of the 
company's stock for at least one year. The company would then be required to 
include in its proxy materials the nomination proposed by shareholders owning 
more than 5 percent of the company's stock continuously for two years. 
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The nominee must be independent of both the nominating group of shareholders and the 
company itself. According to the SEC, the nominating group must affirm in a notice to 
the company that the nominee is completely independent of the nominating group, in 
addition, meets the objective criteria for independence from the company as set forth in 
the listing standards of a national securities exchange or national securities association. 
A board consisting of at least eight or fewer directors would be required to include only 
one nominee; a board with nine to 19 directors, no more than two nominees; a board with 
20 directors or more, up to three nominees. If a company receives more nominees than 
required, the nominees from the largest shareholder group would take precedence over 
the others. 
A shareholder or group of shareholders seeking control of the company would be 
ineligible to nominate a director. Furthermore, the rule would only apply where 
shareholders are permitted by state law to nominate a candidate for election to the board. 
According to an SEC official, the states where most public companies are incorporated, 
including Delaware, do give shareholders the right to nominate candidates to the board of 
directors. 
An independent director is defined by the New York Stock Exchange as an individual 
whom the board of directors "affirmatively determines has no material relationship with a 
listed company." The NYSE also says that a former employee or a family member of a 
company executive, or someone with personal or family business connections to the 
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company, generally cannot be classified as independent, until three years after such a 
relationship has ceased. The NASDAQ Stock Market issues a similar rule designed to 
toughen the definition and power of independent board directors. 
Research Question 
What will be the implications of the SEC's proposed Shareholder Access rule if it is 
adopted from governance, implementation and a public perspective? 
Definition of Terms 
#1 - Proxy: A written authorization given by a shareholder for someone else, usually the 
company's management, to cast his/her vote at a shareholder meeting or at another time. 
#2 - Shareholder: One who owns shares of stock in a corporation or mutual fund. For 
corporations, along with the ownership comes a right to declared dividends and the right 
to vote on certain company matters, including the board of directors. 
#3 - Corporate Governance: A generic term, which describes the ways in which rights 
and responsibilities are shared between the various corporate participants, especially the 
management and the shareholders. 
#4 - Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legislation enacted in response to the high-profile Enron and 
WorldCom financial scandals to protect shareholders and the general public from 
accounting errors and fraudulent practices in the enterprise. The act is administered by 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which sets deadlines for compliance 
and publishes rules on requirements. Sarbanes-Oxley is not a set of business practices and 
does not specify how a business should store records; rather, it defines which records are 
to be stored and for how long. The legislation not only affects the financial side of 
corporations, but also affects the IT departments whose job it is to store a corporation's 
electronic records. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that all business records, including 
electronic records and electronic messages, must be saved for "not less than five years." 
The consequences for non-compliance are fines, imprisonment, or both. IT departments 
are increasingly faced with the challenge of creating and maintaining a corporate records 
archive in a cost-effective fashion that satisfies the requirements put forth by the 
legislation. 
#5 - Brokers: Individual or firm, which acts as an intermediary between a buyer and 
seller, usually charging a commission. For securities and most other products, a license is 
required. 
#6 - Beneficial Owner: The individual who enjoys the benefits of owning a security or 
property, regardless of whose name the title is in. 
#7 - American Federation of Labor-Congress oflndustrial Unions: The American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) is a voluntary 
federation of 60 national and international labor unions. 
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#8 - Independent Director: An individual whom the board of directors affirmatively 
determines has no material relationship with a listed company. 
#9 - Annual Meeting: The company gathering, usually held at the end of each fiscal year, 
at which the previous year and the outlook for the future are discussed and directors are 
elected by common shareholders. Shortly before each annual meeting, the corporation 
sends out a document called a proxy statement to each shareholder. The proxy statement 
contains a list of the business concerns to be addressed at the meeting and a ballot for 
voting on company initiatives and electing the new Board. This proxy ballot authorizes 
someone else at the meeting (usually the management team) to vote on investors' behalf. 
#10 - Shareholder Proxy Access: Currently, investors have the right to put forth a "short 
slate," or limited number of candidates for a board election, but they must do so at their 
own expense, and with considerable difficulty under existing law. As a result, many 
investors feel disenfranchised by the elections process, and seek the right to propose 
board candidates to strengthen the independence and responsiveness of corporate boards. 
The new SEC proposal is controversial because it imposes additional barriers, or 
"triggers," for shareholders to earn the right to nominate a director for the board. The 
proposed rule places a stringent cap on how many candidates can be nominated, who can 
nominate, and under what conditions of corporate malfeasance investors gain the right to 
propose a nommee. 
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# 1 1  -  Poison Pill: Any tactic by a company designed to avoid a hostile takeover. One 
example is the issuance of preferred stock that gives shareholders the right to redeem 
their shares at a premium after the takeover. 
#12 -  Enron: Energy trading company that was investigated for using off-the-book 
partnerships to conceal debt on balance sheets and to inflate profits. Company Chairman 
Kenneth Lay embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars in stock and other benefits before 
the company imploded. 
#13 - WorldCom: With the financial world still reeling from the collapse of Enron, and 
the conviction of its former auditor Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice, world 
financial markets were sent into further turmoil by allegations of massive fraud at global 
telecom WorldCom. Disgraced firm Arthur Andersen attacked former WorldCom chief 
financial officer Scott Sullivan for withholding vital information, as it faced accusations 
of an alleged $4bn (£2.62bn) accounting fraud. The firm pointed the finger at the 
recently resigned CFO Sullivan, as telecom company WorldCom stated it would have to 
restate its financial results to account for billions of dollars in improper bookkeeping. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission charged the US telecommunications giant with 
fraud. Chief Executive Officer Bernard Ebbers faced Congressional Committee as the 
company improperly accounted for $9 billion. 
#14 - Securities and Exchange Act of 1934: With this Act, Congress created the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act empowers the SEC with broad 
authority over all aspects of the securities industry. This includes the power to 
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register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing 
agencies as well as the nation's securities selfregulatory organizations (SROs). 
The Act also identifies and prohibits certain types of conduct in the markets and 
provides the Commission with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and 
persons associated with them. The Act also empowers the SEC to require 
periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities. 
Chapter 2 
History of Shareholder Access 
The SEC first addressed the issue of shareholder access to a company's proxy materials 
with the intent of nominating a director as early as 1942. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission solicited comments on staff proposals including a proposal to revise the 
proxy rules to provide that" . . .  minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use the 
management's proxy material in support of their own nominees for directorship" (SEC 
Press release No. 34-3347 - 1942, December 18). According to testimony of Chairman 
Ganson Purcell before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the 
staff had proposed that shareholders be permitted to use the management's proxy 
statement to canvass shareholders generally for the election of their own nominees for 
directorships, as well as for nominees of the management. Under the proposal, a 
company would not have been required to include more than twice as many candidates on 
the proxy as director positions to be filled. The Commission at this time did not adopt 
rules to provide such access. 
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Again in 1977, the SEC focused on shareholder access on top of a company's proxy 
materials regarding the nomination and election of directors during a broad review of 
shareholder communications, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process, 
and corporate governance in general. In anticipation of public hearings held in 
September of 1977, the SEC, without formally proposing rule changes, requested 
comments on a number of issues, including whether shareholders should have access to 
management's proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of nominating persons of their 
choice to serve on the board of directors. In addition to this overarching question, many 
of the other issues raised in the press releases relating to the 1977 review still remain 
issues that the SEC will need to address if it attempts to provide shareholder access to 
company proxy materials. 
After the 1977 hearings, the SEC proposed and adopted amendments to the proxy rules. 
These amendments did not, however, relate directly to shareholder access to companies 
proxy materials regarding the nomination and the election of directors. The SEC, 
however, did adopt a requirement that companies must state whether they have a 
nomination committee and, if so, whether the nominating committee will consider 
shareholder recommendations. Although the SEC stated its intent to address "some of 
the more complex questions which have been raised in this proceeding relating to 
corporate governance and the means by which corporations can best account to 
shareholders and the public" and determine "what further action, if any, is appropriate 
with respect to shareholder communications and shareholder participation in the 
corporate electoral process generally", the SEC did not take further action on shareholder 
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access to proxy materials. According to a 1980 staff report to the Senate, it was 
concluded that, due to the emerging concept of nominating committees, the SEC should 
not propose and adopt a shareholder access rule at that point in time. The staff 
recommended, however, that monitoring the development of nominating committees and 
their consideration of shareholder recommendations going forward. The staff report 
further cautioned that, if an insufficient number of companies adopted nominating 
committees or the efforts of these committees with regard to shareholder nominations 
proved insufficient, SEC action most likely would be necessary. 
In the board proxy revisions adopted in 1992, the SEC briefly revisited the shareholder 
access issue in connection with amendments to the bona fide nominee rule set out in 
Exchange Act Rule 14a-4, which provides that no person shall be deemed a bona fide 
nominee "unless he has consented to being named in the proxy statement and to serve if 
elected." In adopting the Exchange Act Rule 14a-4 amendments, the SEC stated that the 
difficulty experienced by shareholders in gaining a voice in determining the composition 
of the board of directors. The SEC also stated that proposals to require the company to 
include shareholder nominees in the company's proxy statement would represent a 
substantial change in the SEC's proxy rules. This would essentially mandate a universal 
ballot including both management nominees and independent candidates for board seats. 
Rather than mandating a "universal ballot," the SEC revised the bona fide nominee rule 
to allow shareholders seeking minority board representation to "fill out" a partial or 
"short slate" with management nominees, thus making it easier for shareholder wishes to 
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nominate only two candidates to a seven person board, Exchange Act Rule l 4a-4 permits 
the shareholder to choose five of management's nominees to fill out his or her ballot, 
provided that the shareholder does not name those management nominees on his or her 
proxy card, but instead states only those management candidates that the shareholder is 
opposition to. Although the shareholder still must disseminate and file a separate proxy 
statement and proxy card, he or she can now, in essence, allow shareholders to vote for at 
least some of management's nominees on the shareholder's proxy card. 
Currently, shareholders who wish to effect a change in the composition of a board of 
directors, may conduct an election contest, as noted briefly above, nominate a candidate 
at an annual meeting, or recommend candidates to a company's nominating committee or 
a group of directors fulfilling a similar role. Election contests can require substantial 
expenditure by the shareholder, who must prepare and disseminate proxy materials that 
comply with the SEC's proxy rules. Shareholders instead may nominate directors at the 
annual meeting, object to compliance with applicable state law requirements, as well as 
any requirements contained in the company's proxy material before the meeting has little 
chance of receiving sufficient support. Finally, although shareholders generally may 
recommend candidates to a company's nominating committee or group of directors 
fulfilling this role, shareholders have indicated that this is not effective, as companies 
rarely nominate candidates recommended by their shareholders. 
In a press release issued on May 151, 2003, the SEC solicited public views and feedback 
on the organization's review of the proxy rules and regulations relating to the nomination 
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and election of directors. The majority of commenters supported the SEC' s decision to 
direct this review. Reflecting concern over the lack of accountability of corporate 
directors and the surplus of recent corporate scandals, the commentors generally urged 
the SEC to adopt rules that would grant shareholders greates access to the nomination 
process and greater ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities as owners of their 
respective companies. In addition, many commenters noted that current director 
nomination procedures afforded little to no meaningful oversight to shareholders. 
The 690 commenters who responded to this solicitation were comprised of the following: 
• 424 individuals; 
• 165 unions, pension funds, institutional investors, and institutional investor 
associations; 
• 24 social, environmental, and religious funds and their related service providers 
• 18  law firms and attorneys; 
• 16 associations; 
• 10 corporations and corporate executives; 
• 10 shareholder resource providers; 
• 8 investment advisers and managers; 
• 5 academics 
• 5 other shareholder groups; 
• 2 governmental representatives; and 
• 3 miscellaneous commenters . 
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The vast majority of commenters supported the idea of modifying the proxy rules and 
regulations related to the nomination of the election of directors. Commenters who did 
not support such a modification included all of the corporations and corporate executives, 
most of the legal community, and the majority of associations (mostly business 
associations). 
Very few commenters provided specific suggestions or alternatives about how the proxy 
rules should be reformed to allow shareholders to access proxy materials to nominate 
directors. Of those commenters who did submit detailed proposals, the level of 
specificity in those proposals ranged from merely suggesting minimum shareholder 
ownership thresholds for submitting director nominations to outlining extensive 
proposals for general proxy reform. 
Most of the individual or "retail" investors who commented indicated that they consider 
the current process for the nomination and election of directors to be an ineffective means 
of providing shareholders with the rights of company ownership, but very few offered 
detailed proposals or alternatives. In an interview with the CorporateCounsel.net on June 
10, 2003 Jim McRitchie, Editor of CorpGov.net, addressed the reaction of retail investors 
to the proposed ruling. He stated, "the average shareholder contacting me has been 
outraged to learn that there is no democracy in corporate governance". "They're 
beginning to realize that all the regulations in the world and stiffer penalties will do no 
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good because there are too many avenues for greed and too few enforcers." 
Shareholder groups who supported some level of proxy reform stated that, aside from 
providing shareholders with access to the election process to nominate director 
candidates who would represent investors' best interests, such reform also would have 
the effect of making all corporate directors more responsive to shareholder desires and 
concerns. An explicit or implicit reason behind the desire for reform in several comment 
letters was that reform was particularly necessary in those cases where the proxy process 
and shareholder communications were ineffective. 
Commenters who opposed proxy reform to provide shareholders with access to company 
proxy materials to nominate directors advocated a cautious approach with regard to any 
changes to the nomination and election process. In this regard, the commenters cited that 
such access would be "terribly disruptive to the corporate governance process" and the 
SEC instead should give the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as well as the proposed listing 
standard changes a chance to operate before making such a fundamental change to the 
director nomination process. In addition, some commenters also questioned the SEC's 
authority to adopt shareholder access rules under Exchange Act Section 14(a.). 
A few of the commenters who opposed shareholder access to company proxy materials 
recommended that the SEC instead consider requiring enhanced disclosure about 
nominating committees or revising Exchange Act Section 14a-8(i)(8) to grant shareholder 
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proposals in order to establish a process for shareholder nominees on a company-by­ 
company basis. 
There have been several alternatives to increasing shareholder involvement in the 
nomination of election of directors, some of which could be employed in a combination 
with the other. The following are a few of the alternatives that have been suggested: 
• requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy 
materials; 
• requiring companies to deliver nominating shareholder proxy cards along with 
company proxy materials; 
• requiring expanded disclosure regarding companies' nominating committees, the 
nominating process, and nominating committee consideration of shareholder 
recommendations, with possible requirements under applicable listing standards 
that nominating committees consider shareholder recommendations; 
• requiring expanded disclosure regarding shareholder communications with board 
members with possible requirements under applicable listing standards that 
companies provide shareholders with increased access to, and direct 
communications with, board of directors; and 
• revising Exchange Act Section 14a-8 to allow shareholder proposals relating to a 
company's nominating process. 
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Under the first alternative, a company would include on its proxy card the shareholder 
nominee or nominees and would include specific information, such as biographical 
information, about the shareholder nominee in the proxy statement. Arguments for and 
against each of the companies and the nominating candidates could be included either in 
a word-limited form in the proxy statement or wholly outside the proxy statement, for 
example, on one or more specified and designated websites. All proxy soliciting 
materials, including internet website postings, would be filed electronically with the SEC, 
as is currently the case for definitive additional proxy soliciting materials. In addition, all 




As with any issue, this proposed rule has two very strong and heated opinions. 
Opponents of the proposed rule express concern that if adopted shareholder access may 
result in cluttered ballots with too many investors suggesting alternate candidates and 
might be abused by dissidents to mount a no-premium corporate takeover disguised as a 
boardroom-coup. As the American Society of Corporate Secretaries noted in 1990 in 
response to an equal access rulemaking petition at the SEC, equal or shareholder access 
would result in a "costly, massive, unfocused, multiparty referendum that would 
jeopardize the integrity and functionality of the proxy process." The Business 
Roundtable (BRT), an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. corporations 
with a combined workforce of more than 10 million employees in the United States, feels 
as if the adoption of the proposed proxy access rules at this point in time would not be 
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appropriate. On the fourth of February 2004, the Business Roundtable provided an open 
letter to the SEC, which stated among other concerns that "Among other things, 
shareholder access to company proxy materials to nominate directors has the potential to 
alter dramatically corporate governance. It presents significant questions regarding the 
Commission's authority, federalism, and the relative roles of the states and federal 
government in establishing shareholder rights and delineating the responsibilities of 
shareholders and boards of directors." (Proposed Rules Regarding Security Holder 
Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Release No. 34-48626, 2002, October 23); 
(File No. 87-19-03). Another concern of the Business Roundtable was that the original 
press release by the SEC on October 23, 2003, left several questions unanswered and was 
asking for too many comments and public feedback. The Business Roundtable at this 
point in time requested that the commenting period be extended by 60 days in order for 
them to collect as much information on the topic as possible. They cited that "the 
Commission should extend the comment period for the proposed rules regarding security 
holder director nominations. The proposing release suggests that the Commission has 
been evaluating a proposal of this nature periodically for more than 60 years; there would 
be no harm, and would be great public benefit, in allowing the public an additional 60 
days to respond." (Proposed Rules Regarding Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 
Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Release No. 34-48626, 2002, October 23); (File No. 87-19-03). 
On March 101h, 2004 Franklin D. Raines, the Co-Chairman of the Business Roundtable 
who has recently stepped down as the Chairman and CEO of Fannie Mae amid a storm of 
scandals, followed up with another open letter to the SEC. The letter stated the 
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organizations support and efforts in corporate governance affairs but also stated "we 
cannot support the proposed rules for a number of reasons. First, the proposed rules 
would apply to all public companies, contrary to the Commission's stated goal of 
targeting a limited number of unresponsive companies. Second, the rules would enable a 
small number of shareholders with narrow agendas to impose costs on all shareholders. 
Third, the election contests that would come about under the proposed rules would divert 
the time and energies of corporate management from the business of running the 
company. Fourth, the election of directors under the proposal would threaten the 
cohesion that is indispensable to an effective board of directors. Finally, the proposed 
rules exceed the Commission's authority and improperly intrude on the role of the states 
in this area." ("The Application of the Proposal to Companies and Investors" Panel 
Roundtable Regarding Proposed Rules Relating to Security Holder Director Nominations 
File No. S7-19-03). After all, the main concern for those on the corporate side of the 
issue is that the proposed rule would give too much power to narrow interest groups and 
will leave shareholders open to the negative consequences of these narrow interest 
groups. Franklin D. Raines goes on to state in his letter to the SEC that "Notably, several 
groups already have acknowledged that they would use the proposed rules as leverage to 
advance special interests that are unrelated to the proxy process." He also goes on to 
explain that "In addition to occurring far more frequently than the Commission has 
projected, election contests would impose greater costs than the Commission has 
recognized. A November 2003 survey conducted by the Business Roundtable suggests 
that each affected company would spend an average of $700,000 per year under the 
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proposed rules. By contrast, the Commission has estimated the rules' total cost at a mere 
$4,200 per company." 
The Wall Street Journal had reported that a compromise to the proposal was in the works 
back in the spring of 2004. According to publication, "While details of the proposal are 
still being worked out, it would essentially allow shareholders to sit down with a 
company and agree on a person to replace a director who has been targeted by investors 
for removal. If an agreement couldn't be reached, shareholders would likely gain the 
right to nominate their own director the following year. The proposal may allow 
companies to bypass negotiating with investors if they agree to shareholder-backed 
nominees on the ballot the following year." 
On August iz", 2004 Stephen M. Bainbridge of the publication Tech Central Station 
offered his opinions on the proposed ruling and shed his views in a negative light. He 
asks several rhetorical questions to the proposed compromise. The first being: Which 
shareholders get to sit down with management? There are could be several million 
shareholders for some or any publicly traded company. If it is a select few, then how do 
we ensure that the interests of the few coincide with those of the many? He goes on to 
ask "How, for example, do we ensure that unions don't use the shareholder access rule 
for leverage in collective bargaining (as they often use the current shareholder proposal 
rule?) or that the social activists don't use it to promote a social agenda at odds with the 
profit-maximization interests of most shareholders"? (The SEC: From Bad to Worse, 
2004, August 12). 
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Bainbridge also goes on to state, "if adopted, the proposal may deter qualified individuals 
from being willing to serve as a member of a board. There will be significant risk that 
activist investors will use the rule frequently and at numerous companies. Unlike the 
current system, under the rule, the activists will be targeting individual investors. Who 
would want to serve as a director if there is a significant risk one might be signaled out 
for a smear campaign by unhappy investors?" (The SEC: From Bad to Worse, 2004, 
August 12). 
On December 22, 2003, C.R. Cloutier the Chairman of the Independent Community 
Bankers of America offered the organizations feelings on the topic of shareholder access 
in an open letter to the SEC. He stated, "ICBA opposes these proposed rules for a 
number of reasons. First, banks are still in the process of complying with all the SEC 
regulations issued under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the new listing 
requirements recently issued by the stock exchanges. They are still drafting committee 
charters and reconfiguring their boards and committees to meet the independence 
requirements. These new additional proposed requirements will only add to the 
substantial regulatory burden that public companies are currently experiencing. The SEC 
should defer action on these proposals until companies have had a chance comply with 
the new listing standards and the rules under Sarbanes-Oxley." He went on to comment 
that 'we question whether it is good corporate governance to require companies to 
include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials. Directors have a fiduciary interest 
to serve the shareholders and therefore should have free access to the proxy statement to 
nominate persons that they believe will serve the best interests of all shareholders." The 
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organization believes that there are already procedures in place for shareholder groups to 
nominate directors and wage election contests. "Allowing shareholders access to the 
proxy statement only encourages contests between directors and shareholder groups and 
will result in boards that are not accountable to all shareholders." Cloutier also notes that 
another reason they are against the proposed rule is that it is hard enough to attract 
qualified directors. "These proposed rules will make it even more difficult. Directors 
nominated by the company will become less interested in serving in that capacity if their 
boards become more adversarial and elections will become more contested." Les 
Greenberg, the Chairman of the Committee of Concerned Shareholders, feels that 
"Determining who is and is not 'qualified' should be a decision for the shareholders, the 
corporate owners." Greenberg also stated in an interview with CorpGov.net on June 6, 
2003, that, "In my opinion, incumbent Directors and Management will always find a way 
to determine that an outsider candidate is not 'qualified'." Greenberg went on to 
comment that only verifiable criteria such as advanced degrees, etc. should be used to 
determine qualifications. 
There are also political questions that will be evident if this ruling is approved. The 
election of a shareholder-approved director may cause friction and animosity with the 
existing board members, which would have a highly disruptive effect on the board's 
decision-making processes. Granted, some companies may benefit from the presence of 
skeptical outsider viewpoints. It has been known that in some cases that management 
tends to hold back certain information to boards that have shareholder friendly or 
appointed members in fear that these members may use confidential information for 
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improper purposes. C.R. Cloutier the Chairman of the Independent Community Bankers 
of America has stated that "institutional shareholders most likely to use these new 
proposed election contest rules will be the labor unions and public pension funds that 
have interests and agendas that often are different from the company's. Directors who are 
nominated by these special interest groups will end up politicizing the board and 
impeding the board's proper function." Stephen Bainbridge, a UCLA law professor, has 
stated "you cannot run a corporation by consensus" and that "the new rules transfer 
internal decision-making to external decision-making", potentially paralyzing directors 
forced to always look over their shoulders. With all of these following points being made 
one could argue that ineffective governance could a direct result of this ruling. This was 
expressed by the SEC republican commissioner Cynthia Glassman back in October of 
2003 when she stated that "Even though our intentions are good, . . .  the consequences of 
being wrong could be very serious". Mr. Bainbridge has stated that if the SEC's 
chairman William Donaldson's two republican commissioner's (Glassman and Atkins) 
"cannot kill the proposal, they should at the very least use it to emasculate the rule so that 
it does as little damage to corporate governance as possible". 
Steven Bainbridge also has stated that," a proponent of Rule 14a-11 likely would 
respond that the rule does not give shareholders the power to reverse board decisions, but 
only a power to replace one board member. Fair enough, but there are sound reasons to 
believe that Rule 14a- l 1 would lead to worse rather than better corporate governance. 
The problem is that introduction of a shareholder representative is likely to trigger a 
reduction in board effectiveness." Some opponents are saying that there is a risk that 
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companies will form "friendly" nominating groups to ensure that a candidate of the 
company's choice is nominated through any new shareholder access rule. 
On October 3, 2003 a symposium on shareholder access to the ballot was held at Harvard 
Law School. This symposium brought together SEC officials, CEO's, directors, 
institutional investors, money managers, shareholder activists, lawyers, judges, 
academics, and others to discuss the subject of shareholder proxy access from a wide 
range of perspectives. The first part of this session focused in on the pros and cons of 
shareholder access. This symposium was moderated by Mark Rowe of Harvard Law 
School and contained the input of several leading authorities. One of the first 
commenters on the subject was Steven Rosenbaum who stated that the issue is not about 
"whether shareholders have the right to nominate, or put forward director nominations. 
They do in most every jurisdiction, and we obviously don't have any problem with that." 
He explained that the real issue is really about election contests. "The basic point is that 
people can run election contests now. They do run election contests now." There were 
about 40-election contest in 2003 and one of the main concerns is that this ruling may 
open the door for many more than this. Basically, the optimum number is about where it 
was in 2003 according to Rosenbaum. "Is it a good idea to have more election contests"? 
Rosenbaum went on to expand his view of the proposed rule by saying "at least in the 
near-term, this will primarily be used by more political institutions: the public pension 
funds and unions, who really have other motives for using it. The institutions that really 
are focused on improving the economics of the corporation have better ways and better 
avenues to provide their input into the corporation than a public, adversarial proxy 
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contest. And they've been using those avenues." He went on to explain that, "the 
responsiveness of boards and managers to investor input has grown quite a bit, I think for 
the better. That should be allowed to continue without creating this politicized and 
adversarial process that will result from encouraging more election contests." 
In addition to Steven Rosenbaum, Martin Lipton also had a negative opinion of 
shareholder access when discussed at the Harvard Law School symposium. He explained 
" I  have a real issue here, and it is one of bending the will of management to that of the 
shareholders, and just how's that going to be accomplished." He went on to comment on 
how directors today are very concerned with the input of shareholders and of their 
reputations as a director. "Directors today are very concerned with the about the reaction 
of shareholders, and much more reluctant to accept advice of management, the advice of 
lawyers, even the advice of totally independent lawyers who have no connection with the 
corporation." He stated that one of the first question asked when something is awry is "Is 
this time to throw a whole new regime into the picture?" He said that this is not 
necessarily the way to go and stated that "I'm not sure at all that passing to a potpourri of 
shareholders the ability to have that much influence on the board of directors and 
management of the corporation is going to be good for the business of the corporation 
and, accordingly, good for the economy of the county." "The cost of mounting a proxy 
fight is impossible for the small investor", according to Robert Howell, a visiting 
professor of finance at Dartmouth and co-founder of the Center for Corporate Change in 
Denver. He has stated that the "the system is effectively broke". "The system is really 
not conducive to the democratic process." 
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On March 1 1  of 2004 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced that if the SEC adopts 
the pending shareholder access proposal, they would bring suit challenging the SEC's 
authority to do so. It has been challenged by many parties that the SEC has a very 
limited authority over corporate governance and corporate governance related matters. 
Finally, it has been claimed by many that shareholders have a short-term outlook and that 
their nominees may not guard the long-term interests of companies. They may focus on a 
specific current matter and once that matter is taken care of their attention could sway 
and become disruptive to the rest of the board. Also expressing their opposition to the 
proposed rule are the Financial Services Roundtable, America's Community Bankers and 
the Employment Policy Foundation. 
Chapter 4 
Proponents 
For all those who oppose shareholder access there are just as many or more who are 
proponents of the idea. According to Howard Dean, ifwe want more and better jobs, a 
fair trade policy, better behavior by corporate leaders, more pay equity between those 
who work and those who lead and better corporate morals, we need to make that happen 
by opening the election process for directors of publicly owned corporations so investors 
can easily nominate and elect outside directors. Public ownership of companies should 
mean public majorities on the boards - in other words more outside directors that are not 
hand picked by CEOs. Dean is not the only politician that is known to support the 
proposed rule, as John Kerry generally supports the idea of proxy access. The upcoming 
presidential election will play a major role in the shaping of this idea as the elected 
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president would responsible for naming the replacement of the SEC's chairman William 
Donaldson who may retire after next year. Donaldson and both of his Democratic 
commissioners, Roel Campos and Harvey Goldschmid, support the idea wholeheartedly. 
Shareholder access has been touted as a low-cost way for shareholders to run alternate 
candidates for board positions. Currently, the only way investors can run their own 
candidate is to lead an expensive proxy contest, which can cost at least $250,000 on 
average. Some of the main reasons why shareholders and activists say the current system 
stacks the deck against the shareholders include the view that the director-nomination 
process is management dominated. Management says most of the time that it will 
entertain or consider candidates suggested by shareholders, however, the proxy card will 
be full of the companies nominees. Another concern is that management has full access 
to the companies' coffers to run its own candidates and oppose shareholder initiatives and 
candidates. The cost of running a proxy contest is considerable, especially when you 
consider the fact that management can increase the cost commencing expensive litigation, 
running expensive print ads and initiating multiple mailings. Shareholders also have to 
keep any resolution to a limit of 500 words even though management's opposing 
statements have no limit. 
One of the main proponents of the proposed rule is the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Led by Rich Ferlauto, the Director of 
Pension and Benefit Policy at AFSCME, the organization has been calling for increased 
activism for over two years now. On November 26, 2002 in a statement marked for 
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immediate release, AFSCME called on all "public employee pension funds to increase 
their level of activism immediately in response to a scandal-filled year on Wall Street." 
In a letter to 150 public employee pension funds, which collectively hold approximately 
$ 1  trillion in assets, AFSCME President Gerald W. McEntree urged support initiatives 
that would give shareholders access to corporate proxy statements in order to enhance 
their power to nominate and elect directors of their own choosing. McEntree also stated 
that, "excessive executive compensation, manipulates earning, numerous accounting 
irregularities and the other scandals that have surfaced in the past year are just symptoms 
of the larger problem: shareholders have no real voice in the make up of corporate 
boards. Our proposals aim to change that." 
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
has also expressed its desire to have "shareholder access" adopted by the SEC. In a letter 
addressed to the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 15 ,  2003, Richard L. 
Trumka, the Secretary-Treasurer of the organization, petitioned to have comprehensive 
new rules to permit shareholder-nominated director candidates to appear in the corporate 
proxy statement and proxy card. In the open letter, Trumka expressed the organization's 
concern that "incumbent directors can freely spend the corporate treasury to get re­ 
elected while shareholders are forced to mount costly proxy contests that are difficult for 
particular investors to justify absent a battle for corporate control." The AFL-CIO is the 
federation of America's labor unions, representing 65 national and international unions 
and their membership of more that 13 million working women and men. Union members 
participate in the capital markets as individual investors and through a variety of benefit 
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plans with over $5 trillion in assets. Union-sponsored pension plans account for $400 
billion of that amount. Trumka also stated that they "believe this is essential to repair 
what is now a badly compromised corporate election process". This letter also stated the 
organizations belief that any new rule adopted should be a practical tool to enhance the 
ability of long-term shareholders to nominate and elect directors to represent their 
interests. They stated that these new rules should not provide a tool that can be used to 
facilitate low-cost hostile takeovers by short-term investors. Like many their concern lies 
in the fact that the current incumbent-dominated director election process leaves little 
opportunity for shareholders to hold directors accountable for failing to meet certain 
fundamental standards. 
Another proponent of the "shareholder access" rule is the Christian Brothers Investment 
Services, Inc., a registered investment adviser that manages approximately $3 billion for 
Catholic organizations seeking to combine faith and finance through responsible 
stewardship of Catholic assets. In a letter addressed to the SEC on June 13 ,  2003, Francis 
G. Coleman, the Executive Vice President stated that CBIS "believes that access to the 
proxy provides us with a critical way to communicate the views and opinions of the 
shareholders we represent on a very wide range of issues that affect the long-term 
interests of all corporate shareholders and corporate stakeholders." Their concerns stem 
from the fact that "the current process puts much of the responsibility on Board selection 
in the hands of management." This leaves such organizations and shareholders 
dependent on management in the process of nominating and selecting Board committees. 
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In 2003, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, released a paper titled "Shareholder Access to the 
Ballot". The argument made in this paper is that providing shareholders access to the 
corporate ballot, would improve corporate governance. Bebchuk analyzes each of the 
objections that have been raised against shareholder access and concludes that none of 
them provide a strong basis for they view of opposition. It is in the author's belief that 
the case for shareholder access is strong. Bebchuk suggests that "shareholder power to 
replace directors is supposed to be an important element of our corporate governance 
system, it is largely a myth." (Shareholder Access to the Ballot, Page 2) By and large, 
directors who are nominated by the company run unopposed the majority of the time and 
their election are all but guaranteed. 
Bebchuk says that "By making it unnecessary for shareholder nominees to incur the 
expenses of sending materials to shareholders and obtaining proxies for them, this access 
to the 'proxy machinery' would make it easier for shareholders to elect candidates other 
than those proposed by incumbent directors." The proposal is a moderate advancement 
in the direction of invigorating elections. Lucian Arye Bebchuk suggests that, "stronger 
measures would be worthwhile adopting." One of the main aspects that the author 
focuses on in this paper is the topic of a "triggering event" which the SEC has clearly 
defined. Bebchuk states that "requiring a triggering event would further moderate the 
effects of a shareholder access rule by limiting shareholder nominations to instances in 
which there is already strong evidence of widespread shareholder dissatisfaction. It 
would also provide boards with ample time to address shareholder concerns before 
shareholder nomination is made. " 
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Such a "triggering event" requirement may make an access rule too weak in some cases. 
"Suppose that, shortly after the annual election of a given company, substantial 
shareholder dissatisfaction arose due to certain board actions or disclosures. In such a 
case, if a triggering event in the form of prior shareholder vote were required, it would 
take two years until a shareholder nominee could be elected to the board." (Shareholder 
Access to the Ballot, Bebchuk, Page 4) Such a delay could significantly reduce the rules 
effectiveness. Bebchuk suggests that if"a triggering event were to be established, it 
would be worthwhile to provide a safety valve - allowing shareholder nomination even 
in the absence of a triggering if support for the nomination exceeds an ownership 
threshold that is significantly higher that the threshold for nominations following the 
occurrence of a triggering event." 
While the proposed SEC ruling has its fair share of proponents it also has many still 
suggesting that more needs to be done. Rich Ferlauto, the director of pension and benefit 
policy for the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees has stated 
that, "We think the current proposed rule is a very modest step that is designed to only go 
after boards that have failed in the minds of a significant number of shareholders." "It's a 
misnomer to call that proposal shareholder democracy in any sense". 
According to Pat McGum, special counsel to proxy adviser Institutional Shareholder 
Services, "companies have been much more likely to enact shareholder proposals in the 
past year than they have in previous years." Lucent Technologies for instance, 
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eliminated its staggered board structure on shareholder proposals urging the annual 
election of directors received a majority vote for three straight years. Likewise, Merck 
agreed to declassification of shareholders passed a proposal urging it to do so for five 
years running. "The real impact of ballot access - we're already seeing it this proxy 
season," McGum stated, "anticipation of punishment is almost worse than the 
punishment itself." Institutional Shareholder Services has come out and stated that they 
do support the proposal. They feel that "reform is needed to right a steeply tilted playing 
field, in which management and board incumbents dominate the elections process. 
Moreover, shareholder access will build on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new 
corporate governance listing standards. While those reforms enhance boardroom 
oversight of management, ballot access will enable shareholders to hold boards of 
directors more accountable." ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) does feel that there 
should be changes made to the proposal. They feel that in urgent cases, shareholders 
need to respond right away to redress egregious problems, without waiting for the two­ 
step process (triggering event and then nomination) to play out over two years or more. 
Therefore, they believe that shareholder or groups of shareholders who have significant, 
long-term stakes in the company should have the unfettered right to propose candidates 
even in the absence of a triggering event. ISS believes that the bar for unfettered 
authority should be set high. If the SEC keeps the current thresholds, then eligibility for 
the unfettered right to nominate a director should be set at 10 percent. They also 
recommend that the SEC adjust its thresholds to require 1 percent ownership to file a 
resolution calling for shareholder nominations; 3 percent ownership for the right to make 
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nominations after a triggering event; and 6 percent ownership for the unfettered right to 
nominate director candidates. 
Even without the right to proxy access, shareholders have other options. Those 
dissatisfied with management can simply sell their shares or mount a proxy contest, 
offering a competing line of directors against the incumbent board on a separate ballot. 
Both alternatives have their problems. Selling shares runs counter to the advice that 
financial planners preach. They urge investors to hold shares for the long term in order to 
deal with the markets ups-and-downs. 
In an article penned in early 2003 by Delaware Chancery Court Chancellor William B. 
Chandler II and Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine Jr., the pair described the election process 
as a "forgotten element to reform." (The New Federalism of the American Corporate 
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 2003, 
February 26). In pointed language, they called for the examination of the "management­ 
biased corporate election system" and suggested that policymakers take up the issue of 
requiring equal access to "the proxy machinery between incumbents and insurgents with 
significant nominating support." In 2003, Citigroup Inc. mounted a successful effort to 
block a binding shareholder proposal that, if implemented, would have permitted a 
shareholder or group of shareholders owning at least 3% of Citigroup's shares to include 
a director nominee on the company's proxy card. Citigroup's winning argument to staff 
at the Securities and Exchange Commission was that proxy rules prohibit proposals that 
result in contested elections of directors. This proposal was one of a dozen binding and 
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non-binding proposals sent by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees. All of the other companies had also asked the SEC to block the proposals. 
Despite intense corporate lobbying, a Securities and Exchange Commission proposal to 
give shareholder director nominees a place on the corporate ballot is still alive. "I don't 
think it's dead," said Martin Dunn, deputy director of the SEC's division of corporation 
finance in an article written on July 8, 2004 (Dow Jones Newswire, Proxy-Access 
Proposal For Holder Nominees Is Still Alive). Dunn also stated "I think it's a work in 
progress" as he addressed the American Society of Corporate Secretaries' annual 
conference, in response to a question about the status of the proposed rule in light of 
speculation it was "dead" until after the presidential election - which would make it 
nearly impossible to get a rule in place for next year's annual-meeting proxy season. The 
corporate secretaries group, for its part, worries about unintended consequences, such as 
the possibility the relationship between investors and directors would become even more 
adversarial because the system would lead to a contested election. 
Individual investors, otherwise known as retail investors are also, for the most part large 
proponents of the proposed shareholder access rule. Retail investors are concerned about 
who exactly is serving on the board of directors of the company that they have invested 
their money in. An example of this can be seen in a letter written by Deborah Yost, an 
individual investor from Lincoln, Nebraska to Jonathan G. Katz of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission on 09/17/03. Yost also went on to add that the proposed rule 
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should be reformatted to take the interests of the retail investor into account more. The 
letter reads as follows: 
Dear Secretary Katz, 
As an individual investor, I am submitting comments regarding the proposed rule on shareholder proxy 
access and the ability of investors to better nominate candidates for corporate boards. I urge the SEC to 
support greater democracy in the corporate elections process, and to vigorously support investors' rights to 
nominate legitimate candidates for company boards, and to do so through the company's proxy statement. 
For years, directors have failed to serve shareowners well in their role as investor representatives at public 
corporations, and it is time for this faulty governance system to be reformed. The three-year wave of 
corporate scandals and the continued excesses of executive pay only highlight the flaws in allowing 
incumbent boards to hand-pick director candidates. 
I am concerned with what I've seen in the proposed rule. The rule should go much further in providing 
investors with strengthened rights regarding the nominations process. I oppose the "triggering events" 
described in the proposal. Put forward by opponents of shareholder access earlier this summer, triggers 
have no place in building more democratic board elections. The new rule must provide investors, large and 
small, with greater reins over the boards that represent them-if for nothing else but to pressure directors to 
clean up conflicts of interest. 
The rule must provide fair and robust mechanisms for company owners to place highly qualified and truly 
independent people on the proxy ballot. Only then can shareholders effectively hold individual board 
members accountable for their actions. This proposal puts enough hurdles in front of shareholders that the 
new rule barely improves upon the current process-that of individual investors spending hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of their own money to run a single candidate for the board, which is then undermined 
by executives spending endlessly from the corporate treasury (investors' monies) to counter that candidate. 
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What we currently have in no way resembles an open, democratic election of directors. The triggers 
proposed in the rule make it even less so. Having direct access to the proxy without barriers or triggers 
seems a modest request, given that few investors would use their rights to nominate unless they felt a board 
and corporate executives were grossly mismanaging a corporation. There's also the burden of winning more 
support for an investor candidate than candidates proposed by management. It's just too much effort to find 
qualified candidates ( under increasingly stringent rules of independence) and win majority support unless a 
company has failed its investors. 
Until corporate governance is strengthened to make directors more accountable to shareholders, we'll 
continue having trouble regaining investors' confidence in markets and corporate management. Allowing 
the owners of companies to have a realistic say in the membership of the board is one of the best ways to 
curb the excesses and reduce the conflicts of interest that lead to corporate corruption. Thank you for this 
opportunity to offer my strong support for this historic proposal. I encourage the Commission to adopt final 
rules that are responsive to my concerns. 
Sincerely, 
Deborah Yost 
770 N Cotner Blvd Suite 208 
Lincoln, NE 68505 
Although the shareholder access rules are not yet effective and are likely to change to 
some extent if and when it is finally implemented, companies need to consider the 
possible long-term implications of the proposed rule. According to experts, giving 
investors access to the proxy could drive up costs in several different ways. Tabulating 
votes for and against various directors, for example, could draw out and complicate 
annual meetings if this ruling is approved. Companies might need to hire more investor­ 
relations staff, or need more legal advice on when to fight a proxy war. And there will be 
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additional printing, logistic and other costs simply to inform shareholders of the 
competing resolutions. In an article written by Matt Kelly for Compliance Week, an 
example of how expensive proxy fights can get was highlighted, "Roy Disney spent more 
than $2 million in his battle to oust Eisner; Texas investor Sam Wyly reportedly spent 
more than $10 million in his 2001 battle for control of Computer Associates Inc.-which 
he lost-only to see CA's top executives resign this summer amid an SEC probe." 
(Compliance Week, 2004, October 12). 
Chapter 5 
Impact on Financial Institutions 
Another question is how financial institutions would react to proxy access. Activist 
institutions such as CalPERS, which heartily endorses proxy access, would certainly like 
to have such a powerful tool at their disposal; nine state treasurers sent a letter to the SEC 
in July of2004 urging the agency not to weaken its proposal. Mutual funds, however, 
typically do much less jawboning with their portfolio companies, and simply sell their 
holdings if they disapprove of management. Elizabeth Saunders at Ashton Partners 
believes large players like Fidelity Investments or Janus Funds "won't call a CFO and tell 
him to change his errant ways." Instead, Saunders suspects, mutual funds will withhold 
support for management during a vote and then suddenly side with other shareholders 
who field their own proposals. And most observers expect institutions would tread 
carefully around proxy access. Should investors file a proposal and lose, management 
could potentially use the defeat as an affirmation of their own plans. 
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An important issue that needs to be evaluated is whether shareholders are permitted to 
nominate directors. The proposed rule for shareholder access would be available if 
passed unless state law permits companies incorporate in that state to prohibit 
nominations of directors by the shareholder community through provisions in the 
companies' charter or bylaws. Companies should review these documents and state law 
to determine whether the proposed rule would be applicable to them. Companies should 
also consider how provisions regarding director nominations, including advanced notice 
requirements and director qualifications, can be reconciled with the proposed SEC rules. 
Even if state law permits limitations on shareholder nominees for directors, companies 
need to be sensitive to the board's fiduciary duties and the traditional enhanced scrutiny 
by courts in matters affecting the shareholder base. 
Institutional Shareholder Services believes that if the proposed rule is adopted it would 
improve corporate governance greatly. The rule promises to have a dramatic impact, 
focusing shareholder energy and producing positive outcomes. Triggers are supposed to 
transform vote-no campaigns at recalcitrant companies from the symbolic to the critical. 
Corporations will gain new incentives to remove dead wood from their boards, and they 
are likely to prove more responsive on non-binding proposals. By improving corporate 
governance, shareholder access will help restore investor confidence. 
The proposed shareholder access rule will most likely put greater focus and scrutiny on 
the way companies handle the proxy process and communicate with shareholders. 
Companies may want to take the time to review their practices against corporate 
governance rating systems that influence the way institutional shareholders use their 
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voting power, as well as their lines of communications with influential shareholders. 
Companies may also want to review their "poison pill" rights plan, including the trigger 
thresholds and beneficial ownership language, to assess the implications of the 
shareholder access rule. Investors may eventually pressure companies to amend these 
provisions so that nominating shareholder groups do not trigger the pill. State anti­ 
takeover law and charter provisions tied to beneficial ownership will also need to be 
analyzed. 
The media continues to run articles containing rumors of where the SEC is headed with 
the proposed rule. On May 7, 2004, the New York Times ran a controversial column 
authored by Floyd Norris, which indicated, that the withhold vote trigger would be raised 
to 50% in exchange for not counting broker non-votes. Also, on May 101\ 2004 the Wall 
Street Journal ran an article, which stated that the SEC was going to drop its 1 % opt-in 
trigger in exchange for speeding up the ability for investors to force a contested election. 
The article also noted that the SEC was considering the Business Roundtable's 
suggestion to allow companies to implement a "cure" after a triggering event. Basically, 
the company would be able to remove one or more directors that received high, withheld 
votes. These articles come on the heels of the MBNA Corporation's annual meeting at 
which a TIAA-CREF shareholder proposal received a majority vote regarding the 
appointment of additional directors without personal or financial ties to senior 
management. Two of the MBNA directors received more than 40% withheld vote due to 




In a paper published in October of 2004, the Public Citizen's Congress Watch, one of 
five divisions of the Public Citizen, examined what the role the Bush administration has 
played and will continue to play on the road to getting the shareholder access rule 
adopted. The Public Citizen's Congress Watch is a 160,000 member non-profit 
organization based in Washington, D.C. They represent consumer interests through 
lobbying, litigation, research and public education. The paper states that along with the 
Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Bush Administration has 
pressured the SEC to back down their stance on the shareholder access rule. The 
Business Roundtable also pressured the White House, Treasury Department, Commerce 
Department and Congress to stop forward movement of the shareholder access rule. 
Federal lobbying disclosure forms show that the Business Roundtable spent more than 
$12.8 million lobbying the federal government on the shareholder access rule and other 
issues in 2003 and the first half of 2004. "Five weeks after the shareholder access rule 
was proposed by the SEC, the Roundtable also tried to enlist the Office of Management 
and Budget in stopping the rule." (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, October 2004). 
Multiple SEC officials have told four separate reporters that Treasury Secretary John 
Snow let it be known that the White House does not want the rule to proceed. One of the 
main reason's why the Bush Administration is opposed to the proxy access ruling is that 
some of the administration's largest financial backers are corporations that would be 
affected if it were passed. According to the Public Citizen, certain oppositional, 
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"companies and their employees contributed $55.5 million to Bush's campaigns, the 
Bush-Cheney Inaugural Committee and the Republican National Convention during the 
past 3 election cycles." 
"After vowing in May to pass the rule even if it meant splitting the commission, by June 
Donaldson gave the first indications that he was backing off' (Public Citizen's Congress 
Watch, October 2004). An SEC official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, 
explained to a Wall Street Journal reporter that William Donaldson, "wants a 
compromise and he wants some access to be accomplished." Donaldson has reportedly 
made one large concession to the Business Roundtable. According to the SEC, 
Donaldson has tentatively agreed to drop the "trigger" that would allow shareholders to 
grant themselves access to the proxy statement with a majority vote at a corporation's 
annual meeting. There are also two other concessions that Donaldson could be possibly 
willing to abide by in regards to proxy access. The first one would increase the 
"threshold for triggering shareholder access by increasing the number of "no" votes 
needed against a board-nominated director from 35 percent to 50 percent" (Public 
Citizen's Congress Watch, October 2004). The other concession would be to allow the 
board the chance at the circumvention of "no" votes. If a board-nominated director 
received more than the specified level of "no" votes, the board would be allowed to 
withdraw that nominee and put his replacement up for a vote the following year. Then, 
only if that nominee received the specified level of"no" votes, would shareholder access 
to the ballot be triggered. Shareholder access proponents say this alternative is not 
adequate because it would permit a three-year delay before investors could nominate their 
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candidate. "That won't provide a real improvement to shareholders," Rich Ferlauto, the 
Director of Pension and Benefit Policy at AFSCME said. Others, including Joseph 
Grundfest, a Stanford law professor and former SEC commissioner, have proposed 
another option: majority elections for directors. If directors are required to receive an 
affirmative majority vote from shareholders, companies will have a strong incentive to 
consult with investors on nominees, Grundfest has said. "Clearly, there will be some sort 
of compromise." What that compromise will be and what benefits it will offer remains to 
be seen. 
The lack of movement and the delay in moving forward on the proposed rule has 
infuriated Democratic SEC Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid, who cited the lack of 
progress during a speech he gave to the Investor Responsibility Research Center on 
October 8, 2004. He stated that "the commission's inaction to this point has made it a 
safer world for a small minority of lazy, inefficient, grossly overpaid and wrongheaded 
CEO's" (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, October 2004). Goldschmid went on to 
comment, "So far, in my view, the worst instincts of the CEO community have 
triumphed" (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, October 2004). These comments came 
after months of negotiations with the SEC and it's chair William Donaldson. Donaldson 
has recently commented on the further ruling delay by saying "On this issue the 
commission has done nothing for 40 years" (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, October 
2004). With the shareholder access proposal basically stalled at this point, a coalition of 
CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement System, New York State Common 
Retirement Fund, AFSCME and Illinois State Board of Investments have submitted 
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shareholder proposals to both Walt Disney and Halliburton to give shareholders the right 
to nominate up to two directors. Last year, the AFSCME submitted a similar proposal to 
Marsh & McLennan, but the proposal was withdrawn after the company appointed a 
former federal prosecutor to its board of directors. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
After the re-election of President George W. Bush in November of 2004 the issue of 
proxy access may be stalled. The Bush administration may now try and bury the 
proposed proxy access proposal. A Kerry administration might have named advocate, 
Harvey Goldschmid as SEC Chairman. However, Goldschmid might leave his SEC 
commissioner post by next August. Current SEC chair William Donaldson - once a 
proxy access proponent, today an agnostic - may also retire soon, giving the White 
House and the heavily weighted Republican Congress power to install a new leader 
committed to dumping the idea or exploring alternatives. Although the agency is 
officially independent, the SEC chair acknowledges that he does serve at the pleasure of 
the President. Donaldson, however, may seek to craft a weakened compromise in the 
period before the new Congress takes office in January of 2005. Further, expect the SEC 
staff to side more with executives trying to bat dissident shareholder proposals at 
compames. 
With the current status of shareholder access being in a holding pattern there is every 
possibility that a decision will be postponed until late spring at the earliest. As each 
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interested party continues to mediate and lobby with their own specified versions, the 
conclusion to this much-debated proposal may end up in a totally different model than it 
is currently assembled. The debate will continue to focus on those in favor, who believe 
that greater access will result in a more structured system where accountability will be 
enhanced. The opposition will continue to express their belief that too much power in the 
shareholders hands may result in narrow interest groups gaining too much control 
resulting in negative consequences. 
The results of personal interviews with individuals who each have their own perspectives 
on the issue and through a survey of financial institutions, show that some form of 
shareholder proxy access needs to be implemented and the majority of those spoken to 
would definitely support the proposed idea in one form or another. Of the 30 financial 
institutions that were surveyed the majority indicated that they would be in favor of some 
type of shareholder access rule but would need more time to study and learn about the 
issue. Of the 20 individuals contacted for personal interviews seven responded with 
succinct answers while the majority of those contacted were apprehensive in commenting 
at all or before learning more about the issue. 
48 
interested party continues to mediate and lobby with their own specified versions, the 
conclusion to this much-debated proposal may end up in a totally different model than it 
is currently assembled. The debate will continue to focus on those in favor, who believe 
that greater access will result in a more structured system where accountability will be 
enhanced. The opposition will continue to express their belief that too much power in the 
shareholders hands may result in narrow interest groups gaining too much control 
resulting in negative consequences. 
The results of personal interviews with individuals who each have their own perspectives 
on the issue and through a survey of financial institutions, show that some form of 
shareholder proxy access needs to be implemented and the majority of those spoken to 
would definitely support the proposed idea in one form or another. Of the 30 financial 
institutions that were surveyed the majority indicated that they would be in favor of some 
type of shareholder access rule but would need more time to study and learn about the 
issue. Of the 20 individuals contacted for personal interviews seven responded with 
succinct answers while the majority of those contacted were apprehensive in commenting 




Law Professor from Widener College: 
1 .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
No. 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
Not sure I understand this question. It may be responsive to observe, however, that if the rule is 
adopted it will be far more likely to be used as a negotiating chip than as a way to nominate actual 
director candidates. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company 
executives? 
At this point, not much. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
Yes. It would invest withhold campaigns with much greater significance, resulting in greater expense 
associated with otherwise ordinary annual meetings. 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
"Could" cause strife, yes; likely to cause strife, no - because I doubt that the rule would result in very 
many actual competing nominations. 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
As a practical matter, I doubt that very many shareholders will actually take advantage of the rule. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially after the 
Presidential election? 
I have no special or inside knowledge about this issue, but what I understand is that the rule is 
essentially dead in the water and unlikely to be propelled forward. The election results may have 
contributed to this situation, although it ls unclear that a different election result would have had any 
different consequence as far as the rule is concerned. 
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Response from individual at the American Society of Corporate Secretaries: 
1 .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
I hate to answer your question with a question, but which form of the rule? The original version 
proposed access to the following year's proxy be granted to shareholders if the board's slate of 
nominees failed to garner 35% of the votes cast. Compromise versions have suggested that the 
threshold for access should be 50% (considered unreachable by many) and that there needs to be a 
self-curing provision. (Self-curing would allow a board to "fix" the situation and obviate the need for 
shareholder access - action such as splitting a Chair/CEO or de-classifying a board.) 
Personally, I think a 35% threshold with a self-curing provision would be a good compromise. 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
I'm not sure what formal processes should be adopted to ensure shareholder access. Since 
shareholder votes at annual meetings are a matter of public record, it's not as if these things can be 
hidden. Once the threshold was met, proxy access would have to be granted or a self-cure would have 
to have been made. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company executives? 
At a company like Disney, probably a lot. At "quieter" companies, not much. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
It will cause some kind of implementation costs, and companies are sure to label whatever costs are 
incurred as "considerable." 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
Maybe at first. But directors are sharp people - they wouldn't have gotten seats at the board table if 
they were dummies - they'll adjust. Within a few years of adoption, things will run smoothly. After 
all, most companies don't have the kind of strife among shareholders that is so prevalent at places 
like Disney. At a company with "happy" shareholders, the adoption of the rule would have minimal 
impact. 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
I have no idea. This is really a follow-up to your Question 2. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
The Republican SEC commissioners are the ones who've opposed the rule as originally proposed - 
with President Bush having been re-elected they come from a position of strength in arguing for the 
compromises they want. The Democratic commissioners want to stick close to the original proposal, 
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and Chairman Donaldson seems unwilling to break the tie. I think it's highly likely that the 2005 
Proxy Season (roughly February through April) will not see the rule adopted. 
Response from individual at the State of Wisconsin Investment Board: 
I .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
Yes. Shareholders should be able to communicate with the officers and directors at every public 
company. The directors need to be accountable to the shareholders, but in order to be responsible, 
they need to hear from the shareholders. Shareholders would also benefit in conversing with the 
directors and understanding the issues. 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
Good question. Shareholders should be able to nominate candidates, but they also need to be 
cognizant of the individuals they request. We do not want to see the business "good old boys" 
changed into the institutions "good old boys." Currently the search firms look for specific criteria 
suggested by the companies. Perhaps the expansion of criteria would be beneficial ie. search firms 
look at CEO/CFO/CAO perhaps look at the qualifications more so than the title. As for the time 
limit, it seems that two years after the fad is far too long of a period to first be able to nominate a 
candidate for election. There needs to be something more direct and accessible. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company executives? 
Company executives are thinking about this issue. They do not want this issue to be approved by the 
SEC , thus are spending money and time to create ways to block the passage of access to the proxy. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
No. 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
Political strife can be caused regardless of this particular rule. To some degree, there will always be 
the underlining "it's political" theme. However, if the process to address the issue is handled 
properly there should not be any additional mode of politics. Again, the search firms could increase 
their databases to include experiences as more important than titles (we all know that several people 
without the CEO CFO etc title are very capable of completing those duties). 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the: number of proposed nominees? 
I don't think there will be an over abundance of nominees. This is a process that is going to take a bit 
of time to build. The search firms will need to expand their databases, new director candidates may 
be hesitate to go to a board that is in turmoil, lots of factors play into the decision of whether or not 
to become a director. Additionally, while there are people out there whom are capable of the 
responsibilities, they may not be running to finish line to compete. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
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The push by large institutional investors to is adopt this rule. With the wherewithal of the public 
pension funds and the combined efforts of the funds, it seems as though it will pass. Another clue to 
passage would be the energy put forth by public corporations to block the passage. If the companies 
were not worried about this rule, they would not be taking the extra time and energy to fight it. 
Response from individual at the National Association of Corporate Directors: 
1 .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
No. Before passing such a rule, the SEC should give the recent governance reforms (such as the 
relatively new SEC rule re nominating committees) a chance to operate. 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
The rule contains a detailed description of how it would work. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company executives? 
It is not a management issue. However, it is very much on the minds of the members of board 
nominating committees. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
We have no comment on the cost issue. 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
No, it would not cause political strife within the boardroom. However, in some circumstances, the 
rule could be a distraction to the work of nominating committees. 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
The rule contains provisions that if followed would curb the number of proposed nominees. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
As we understand it, chances are 50 - 50, depending on how the chairman votes. We are currently 
looking into this matter. Please alert us if you hear anything. 
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Response from individual at Christian Brothers Investment Services: 
1 .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
We support the principle of shareholder nominees, though we have some differences with the 
proposal as written 
2 .. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
We believe that the proposal should offer ballot access to any shareholder that can gain the support 
of a majority of fellow shareholders, with reasonable safeguards to ensure that companies are not 
overwhelmed. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company executives? 
I don't know. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
It should not, since the barriers to actualily getting a shareholder nominee on the ballot are high 
enough to ensure that few companies see one. 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
Not sure what is meant by "political strife." If it results in boards debating issues and hearing more 
points of view than before, it would acheive an important goal. 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
Well governed and well run companies will likely not face shareholder nominees, so the best way to 
limit the number will be to avoid the issues that result in nominees from being offered. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
In the current political climate, I presume that the chances are smaller. However, it is not yet clear 
that the direction of the SEC will change because of the election. 
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Response from individual at California Public Employees Retirement System: 
I .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
Yes 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
See attached website but the current position by the SEC has changed since our comment letter was 
submitted. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company 
executives? 
Fair amount 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
No 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
Not likely 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
See attached website as this will highlight our stance on this question. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
Pretty good. 
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Response from individual at Glass-Lewis & Co. LLC: 
1 .  In your opinion should the Shareholder Access rule be approved by the SEC? 
The SEC should put forth the rule. Shareholders should have access especially when the history of 
the board is unreceptive. 
2. How should the proposed rule work if adopted? 
The rule if adopted should have specific thresholds where it can reasonable be reached by 
shareholders. Currently the proposed triggers are fairly substantial and hard to meet by investors. 
3. How much at this point in time do feel Shareholder Access is on the minds of company 
executives? 
Company Executives are paying attention even though the rule has not passed yet. They will 
continue to track the developments of the rule. 
4. Will this rule cause considerable costs in regards to implementation? 
Since this rule will probably rarely be used as is since the triggers are substantial probably not. If so 
then the shareholders are the ones that most likely will incur the cost. 
5. Do you feel that if adopted this rule could cause political strife on company boards? 
Political Strife? Most likely not since shareholders are capable of determining who should run and 
who should not. Board members do not have to be best friends as harmony does not have to be the 
key. No matter what the different agendas will be shareholder interest should be protected. 
6. Will there be an effective way to limit the number of proposed nominees? 
Since the rule does have proposed limits in regards to ownership thresholds depending on the size of 
the board I do not see this being a major problem. 
7. What are the chances that this rule or a version of this rule will be adopted? Especially since the 
Presidential election has been decided? 
Not in the format that it is in now. With William Donaldson most likely on the way out if it is going 
to be adopted it will have to change shape. Depends on who will be elected as the SEC Commissioner 
to take Donaldson's place. It is a hard concept to oppose but the thresholds are so hard to meet. 
Chapter 8 
Results of Survey Question 
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What is your view on the SEC's proposed "Shareholder Access" rule and how, if at all, will it affect 
your voting patters if it is passed by the SEC? 
The majority of the responses received from those responsible for proxy voting at 
financial institutions stated that they would be in favor of some variation of the proposed 
rule. Most of the respondents did state that they would back such and idea but that they 
would have to learn more about the parameters of the proposed rule and its see it in it's 
final form. Surprisingly, a large number of those polled stated that they did not know 
enough about the issue currently and would only learn more when the issue was resolved 
by all parties involved. The names of the financial institutions below have been changed 
for the purpose of this paper. The following is a sample of the responses that were 
received in response to the survey question: 
1 .  XYZ Investments: 
Would most likely support it depending on the parameters of the rule. If for example there were 50 
independents running for 5 spots on a board they would not look favorable upon it. They need to learn 
more about the subject before they could comment any further. 
2. ABC Investments: 
Proxy Contact at the institution was not aware of the proposed Shareholder Access rule. Needs to read up 
upon once it is decided on. 
3. DEF Investments: 
We are waiting for the ruling to come out in order to make a decision. 
4. MNP Investments: 
We are one of the leading proponents of the proposed "Shareholder Access" rule. Very much in favor ofit. 
5. LTC Investments: 
We would be pro- "Shareholder Access" because they are shareholder friendly when making their 
decisions. We need to learn more on the topic but does not see it being a problem unless the cost to the 
company would impede them from running the company smoothly. What is the incremental cost to the 
company? 
6. KJH Investments: 
We are definitely supportive of the shareholder access rule. It's hard to say ifit will affect our voting 
patterns because there is currently so much that is left to be decided about the rule. 
7. LCX Investments: 
If approved we would definitely support the ruling. 
8. JYU Investments: 
We would definitely be in favor of the proposed ruling but are waiting on its final form to comment further. 
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